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THE VISUAL AND THE LAW OF CITIES
Stephen R. Miller*
I.

Introduction

“Man only knows himself insofar as he knows the world—the
world which he only comes to know in himself and himself only
in it.”1–Goethe
It is expected that law, whether religious or secular in
origin, is a textual discipline, and that no matter what law’s
subject, the legal discourse will be conducted in words, and that
the meaning of law will depend upon textual interpretation.2
There are several areas of law, however, that challenge that
general supposition, and where the visual is as important as
the text in framing the law and rendering legal decisions.
Among those are the allied fields of law that deal with building,
construction, architecture, planning, developing, preserving,
and otherwise creating the places where we live. For lack of a
better term, I will call these fields—sometimes individually
referred to as land use law, real estate law, construction law,
and so on—the law of cities. Admittedly, there is no law school
class or practitioner treatise upon the law of cities, but it will
be helpful, for purposes of this article, to have a shorthand to
reference the multifarious collection of place-making laws.
By law of cities, I also do not intend to limit the discussion
to urban areas. Rather, “cities” is used here to connote the
larger conception of such entities inclusive not only of their

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. B.A.,
Brown University. M.C.P., University of California, Berkeley. J.D.,
University of California, Hastings College of Law.
1. RICHARD SENNETT, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE EYE: THE DESIGN AND
SOCIAL LIFE OF CITIES vii (W.W. Norton & Co. 1992).
2. See, e.g., John 1:1 (King James) (“In the beginning was the Word, and
the Word was with God, and the Word was God.”); see generally ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS (2012).
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urban areas, but also suburbs, adjacent new towns, rural towns
and hamlets, and the hinterlands of cities. As such, the law of
cities, as used in this article, is intended to address the entirety
of the possibility of settlements, excluding only those areas of
wilderness either intentionally set aside or otherwise not
exploited by human endeavor.3
This article will attempt to explore, through four separate
“tableaux,” or brief sketches, four ways in which the visual
interplays with the law of cities, and how a deeper
understanding of this intersection can assist in the
development of these laws and their underlying policies. This
discussion will by no means be definitive. However, by
presenting these four approaches in which the visual
complicates and assists the law of cities, and sometimes even
acts as the law of cities, it is hoped the article will spur a
dialogue on the law’s relationship to the visual.
First, the article explores the law’s longstanding adverse
relationship to the visual, as well as general efforts to change
that relationship. The article then turns to the four tableaux
that explore the law of cities and the visual, each of which
presents a different factual situation that explores how the
visual relates to the law of cities. In the first tableau, the
article discusses the question of the cultural value of a handdrawn map by reviewing the U.S. Supreme Court’s nineteenth
century jurisprudence on Spanish-era diseños, or maps, which
were part of Spanish and Mexican California land grants. In
the second tableau, the article discusses the question of
whether aesthetics is a proper domain of the law of cities by
comparing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Berman v.
Parker4 and its progeny with Daniel Burnham’s 1909 Plan of
Chicago (the “Plan”),5 which was the first, and perhaps most
3. Such a conception of cities is consistent with approaches to regional
planning. For a visual representation of this approach, see, for example,
Patrick Geddes, The Valley Section, SIR PATRICK GEDDES MEMORIAL TR.,
http://www.patrickgeddestrust.co.uk/valleysection.htm (last visited Oct. 9.
2012).
4. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
5. DANIEL H. BURNHAM & EDWARD H. BENNETT, PLAN OF CHICAGO:
PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE COMMERCIAL CLUB DURING THE YEARS
MCMVI, MCMVII, AND MCMVIII (Charles Moore ed.,1908) [hereinafter PLAN
OF CHICAGO].
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important, comprehensive plan drafted for an American city in
the “City Beautiful” tradition. The third tableau explores the
production of space and the philosophy of Henri Lefebvre in the
context of the visual as law, most notably, in the rise of visual
zoning and building codes. The fourth tableau extends the law
and literature movement to the visual arts through the
philosophy of Edward Casey as applied to the work of painter
Edward Hopper. Allied with the presentations of the third and
fourth tableaux are questions of how legal and visual
abstractions relate to and affect the individual.
Like works of art that envelop their viewers, such as the
medieval unicorn tapestries,6 a chapel of Rothkos,7 or a
courthouse lobby of Ellsworth Kelly color-field paintings,8 these
four tableaux seek to illustrate for the reader how the law of
cities is deeply intertwined with the visual, and how its
evolution and the fulfillment of its role in building cities is also
inextricably intertwined with the visual. The article concludes
by offering a forward-looking approach to the visual in the law
of cities.
II. The Canvas: Distrusting, Embracing the Visual
“The best way to understand a legal concept is to analyze it the
way a geologist looks at the landscape.”9–Gerald Frug
For the last several hundred years, the most recognizable
legal image has been that of Justitia, a blindfolded woman
6. See The Unicorn Tapestries, METRO. MUSEUM OF ART,
http://www.metmuseum.org/metmedia/interactives/adults-teachers/theunicorn-tapestries (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (describing series of seven
tapestries hung together in the round and dating from 1495–1505 that
collectively show hunt of unicorn).
7. See
About
the
Chapel,
ROTHKO
CHAPEL,
http://www.rothkochapel.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=3&Itemid=31 (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (describing a Houston, Texas chapel
built in 1961 hanging multiple Marc Rothko paintings in the round).
8. See
The
Boston
Panels,
U. S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN.,
http://www.gsa.gov/graphics/pbs/39_Ellsworth_Kelly.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2012) (describing 21 aluminum color-field paintings by artist Ellsworth Kelly
hung in the round in Boston’s John Joseph Moakley U.S. Courthouse).
9. Gerald Frug, A Legal History of Cities, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES
READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE 154, 154 (Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 2001).
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carrying scales.10 The image is intended to portray objectivity
and impartiality. The implication, if only in metaphor, is that
by purposefully restraining access to the visual, a tribunal is
better served in objectively weighing the arguments of the
parties before it. Of course, many of the other senses—hearing
or touch, among them—are equally capable of conveying to an
arbiter the identity or status of the person before the tribunal.
As such, it is not simply the identity-masking nature of the
blindfold that the metaphor seeks to implicate; rather, it is that
the visual in its entirety is a sense not trusted with the legal
enterprise.11
One commentator has noted:
Law, like most other disciplines or practices that
aspire to rationality, has tended to identify that
rationality (and hence its virtue) with texts
rather than pictures, with reading words rather
than “reading” pictures, to the point that it is
often thought that thinking in words is the only

10. Compare JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE:
INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC
COURTROOMS (2011), with ARLO GUTHRIE, Alice’s Restaurant Massacre, on
ALICE’S RESTAURANT (Reprise Records 1967). The song’s protagonist and Obie,
his friend, accused of throwing trash over a cliff,
stood up with the twenty seven eight-by-ten color, glossy
pictures, and the judge walked in, sat down with a seeing
eye dog, and he sat down; we sat down. Obie looked at the
seeing eye dog, and then at the twenty seven eight-by-ten
color, glossy pictures with circles and arrows and a
paragraph on the back of each one, and looked at the seeing
eye dog. And then at twenty seven eight-by-ten color, glossy
pictures with circles and arrows and a paragraph on the
back of each one and began to cry, ’cause Obie came to the
realization that it was a typical case of American blind
justice.
GUTHRIE, supra.
11. Taken literally, the metaphor clearly breaks down. A blindfolded
judge would also be unable to review any written text, leaving the judge’s
only access to knowledge about a case ostensibly obtained through hearing.
Hearing, of course, is equally prejudicial, if the judge knows the voices of the
advocates or the parties on trial.
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kind of thinking there is.12
Law’s efforts to rid itself of the visual are not sui generis;
rather, it follows a long tradition in the Western intellectual
tradition that eschews the ability of the visual to adequately
convey truth. Consider, for instance, challenges to the visual
such as George Berkeley’s “crooked oar” (is an oar that appears
crooked when submerged half-way in the water truly bent?)13
and modernist philosophers’ discussions of color (when we
agree we see “red,” are we seeing the same thing?).14
Many who have considered the use of the visual in law
have challenged the use of images in law, arguing that visual
images are not subject to the same stringent form of
interpretation as words, and that visual images are easily
manipulated.15 A commentator reviewing the use of visual
media in U.S. Supreme Court decisions argues that the
perceived “neutrality and accuracy” of visual attachments to
decisions do not warrant “automatic deference.”16 For instance,
a visual attachment in Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Board v. Pinette was taken from a low angle, which made a tenfoot Latin cross appear substantially taller than it is.17
Similarly, maps in redistricting cases can make districts
appear more unusual than they might to voters in those
districts.18 As with any visual media, these attachments are
12. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 689 (2012) (quoting NEAL FEIGENSON &
CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY 4 (2009)).
13. GEORGE BERKELEY, THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND
PHILONOUS (1713), reprinted in THE WORKS OF GEORGE BERKELEY, BISHOP OF
CLOYNE § 2:238 (A.A. Luce & T.E. Jessop eds. 1949); see also Lisa Downing,
George
Berkeley,
STAN.
ENCYC.
OF
PHIL.
(Jan.
19,
2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/berkeley.
14. See Barry Maund, Color, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. (Sept. 18, 2006),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/color/ (describing history of
debate on color arising with Descartes and Locke, and subsequent iterations
of the debate).
15. Hampton Dellinger, Words Are Enough: The Troublesome Use of
Photographs, Maps, and Other Images in Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1704, 1707 (1997).
16. Id.
17. 515 U.S. 753, 815 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Dellinger, supra
note 15.
18. See Dellinger, supra note 15.
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influenced by color, angle, size, perspective, and the choice of
cropping that is always present in a visual representation.19
While the Court continues to use the visual in its
decisions,20 it is likely that such fears described above, not to
mention tradition, encourage the Court to prioritize text-based
descriptions over visual attachments. For instance, in the
recent U.S Supreme Court case of PPL Montana, LLC v.
Montana,21 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion utilized over
1,500 words and twenty-nine source citations to describe the
course of three rivers at issue in the case, but utilized no maps
whatsoever.22 The State of Montana, in its briefing of the case,
provided a detailed map that clearly denoted the course of the
three rivers in a single image.23 Interestingly, the dominant
legal search engine, Westlaw, stripped the appended images
from its HTML version of the State of Montana’s briefing,24
which implicates a more practical reason for not using the
visual in legal decisions: technical issues with reproducing such
images.
The visual raises other practical legal issues. For instance,
Google recently settled litigation for its Book Search function
with all of the text providers but determined that addressing
the copyright of images would be too difficult, and so the
images of such scanned books are being removed.25
Perhaps the best place to look for how the law addresses
the visual is not the legal system’s high court, but rather in the
trial courts that do the dirty work of gathering evidence. There,
the story of the visual is more complex. Prior to the 1850s, legal
evidence usually consisted of words: spoken testimony, written
depositions, contracts, deeds, and similar instruments.26
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1705 (listing Supreme Court cases with images in their
opinions).
21. 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012).
22. See id. at 1221-25.
23. Brief for Respondent at Appendix 1a, PPL Montana, LLC v.
Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) (No. 10-218), 2010 WL 5126226.
24. See id. Westlaw’s PDF version of the filing does display the maps,
however.
25. Tushnet, supra note 12, at 685.
26. Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence
and the Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 5 (1998).
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Images in court were usually those that were already
authorized legal documents, such as county-approved maps,
surveys in land dispute cases, or drawings and diagrams in
patent cases. 27 As one commentator described it:
When unofficial drawings were used, they were
not thought to be evidence. Only with the advent
of photography were these broader kinds of
visual
representations
conceptualized
as
evidence, their evidentiary value deemed
significant enough to be fought over, their
improper inclusion or exclusion deemed worthy
grounds for appeal. Indeed, by the end of the
century, the use of visual evidence had
blossomed, and images of many sorts, from
photographs to diagrams to three-dimensional
models, were frequently used in an effort to
persuade the jury. Visual representation, not
limited to photography, had become a significant
persuasive technique in the courtroom. 28
Photographs opened the door to what came to be called
“demonstrative evidence,” and in our current image-saturated
culture, the strain of how to handle the increasing body of
visual evidence is palpable.
In response to this strain, some commentators have argued
that a new “visual legal realism” is needed, recognizing that
“[a]s goes popular discourse, so goes legal rhetoric.”29 Images
have never been so easy and cheap to produce, and so easily
distributed as they are today. If Marshal McLuhan was right,
and the “medium is the message,”30 these commentators argue,
then the law must accept the ready prevalence of such images
and its influence on the rhetoric of the day. 31 Already, the
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Richard K. Sherwin, A Manifesto for Visual Legal Realism, 40 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 719, 724 (2007).
30. See generally MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE
EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1964).
31. See Richard K. Sherwin et. al, Law in the Digital Age: How Visual
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practice of law itself, especially at the trial level, is saturated
with images, and courtrooms don the latest technologies for
electronic projection of visual evidence.32 According to some
commentators, the reason is obvious:
[R]adical
shifts
in
the
technology
of
communication alter our mind as well as our
culture. For example, unlike words on the page,
visual images on the screen are far more likely to
directly
stimulate
heightened
emotional
responses. Viewers tend to react to screen images
in the same way that they react to reality. Naive
realism apparently is the natural default setting
for visual common sense. Subject to our
unthinking gaze, which is mostly how we watch,
the screen seems to present a window onto
reality. We tend to look through the medium
rather than at it. Moreover, once we comprehend
what we see, that’s usually all we need to believe
it. In other words, the familiar commonplace that
“seeing is believing” is not just idle folk
knowledge—not that there is anything “idle”
about folk knowledge. Indeed, such knowledge is
a major source not only of mental content but
also of the cognitive tools most people use most of
the time.33
This increasing use of the visual in the legal profession,
even in its core judicial setting, will require more advanced
thought on how the visual is used in the legal profession in a
time when visual images proliferate, and are considered an
expected part of discourse.34 For purposes of this article, this
Communication Technologies are Transforming the Practice, Theory, and
Teaching of Law, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 227, 241-45 (2006) (listing
varieties of visual media used in courts and studies on effectiveness of visual
communication).
32. Sherwin, supra note 29, at 727.
33. Id. at 725-26.
34. Id. at 731 (offering four “rules of thumb” for how to think about how
the visual shapes legal decision-making: “(1) simplify the complex; (2) exploit
the iconic; (3) emulate generic fictions (to produce the truth); and (4) respect
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review of the visual in law generally provides the foundation
from which to consider several instances of how the visual
operates in the law of cities. Similar to law generally, the law of
cities evinces a range of reactions to the visual, and the context
in which the visual appears is as important as any bright-line
rule.
III. First Tableau: Diseños and the Value of a Hand-Drawn
Map
“It is not down in any map; true places never are.”35–Herman
Melville
This tableau addresses the relationship between the visual
and the law’s overarching need for specificity, and how diseños,
or maps, attached to Spanish California land grants express
the cultural specificity of such requirements.
More than the law generally, the law of cities has
embraced the visual. As noted previously, even when courts
historically only took evidence in a textual form, they often
made exceptions for maps and surveys that assisted the court
in adjudicating a case involving land.36 The law of cities’
inclusion of the visual remains to this day. In many cities and
counties, a zoning map is the legal means of delineating zoning
district boundaries,37 and where there is disagreement as to
permitted uses between text in the zoning code or enabling
ordinance and the zoning map, the zoning map generally
controls.38 For instance, in Coastal Property Associates, Inc. v.
Town of St. George, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held
that the zoning map’s enabling ordinance “text is merely
illustrative and was included to make it easier to locate the
districts generally on the Map, and that one has to refer to the
the medium”).
35. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK, OR, THE WHALE 57 (Univ. of Cali.
Press 1981) (1851).
36. Mnookin, supra note 26.
37. See generally 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9:3
(5th ed. 2012); 1 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING
AND PLANNING § 10:13 (4th ed. 2012) [hereinafter RATHKOPF].
38. See generally RATHKOPF, supra note 37.
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Map itself to identify a district’s precise borders.”39 It is the
filing and acceptance of a subdivision map that legally
subdivides a property into lots in most jurisdictions.40 At
common law, the act of filing for record a map of property
showing lots separated by defined areas named as streets
constitutes an offer to dedicate the street to public use.41
Condominium plans requirements include a “description or
survey map” showing monumentation, a three-dimension
description of “sufficient detail” to identify the common areas
and each separate interest.42 Flood maps, created by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”), determine
applicability of the federal government’s flood insurance
programs.43 A condemning agency that draws a line delineating
a potential future condemnation is liable for pre-condemnation
damages where there is “unreasonable delay” in the
condemnation.44 In transfer of development rights schemes, it
is the map that delineates the “sending” and “receiving”
areas.45
39. 601 A.2d 89, 90 (Me. 1992).
40. See Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 83 Cal.
Rptr. 740, 742 (Ct. App. 1970) ("The recording of a final tract map for a
normal subdivision automatically converts what was formerly a single parcel
into as many separate lots as appear on the tract map."). See generally 9
HENRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, MILLER & STARR CALIFORNIA REAL
ESTATE § 25:61 (3d ed. 2012).
41. See Wright v. City of Morro Bay, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 722 (Ct. App.
2006) (citing S.F. Sulphur Co. v. Contra Costa Cnty., 276 P. 570, 372 (1929);
Eltinge v. Santos, 152 P. 915, 917 (1915); Niles v. City of Los Angeles, 58 P.
190, 192 (1899)).
42. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1351(e) (West 2012).
43. See Map Service Center, FED. EMER. MGMT. AGENCY,
https://msc.fema.gov/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/FemaWelcomeView?storeId=1
0001&catalogId=10001&langId=-1 (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
44. Klopping v. City of Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345, 1356 (1972); see also 11
MILLER & STARR, supra note 40, § 30:19. These cases are highly fact
dependent. For instance, in Smith v. California, 123 Cal. Rptr. 745 (Ct. App.
1975), the court held on other facts that it was not unreasonable to announce
plans for a proposed freeway as far as 15 years in advance in view of the
necessity for hearings, environmental studies, and the other required
processes.
45. E.g., BOULDER CNTY., COLO., LAND USE CODE § 6-700(b) (2011),
available
at
http://www.bouldercounty.org/find/library/build/lucodearticle06.pdf
(“The
sending sites to be preserved and protected through the application of this
article are those designated on the Boulder County TDR Sending Sites Map,
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While the law of cities accepts these visual documents into
law, the question of how far to extend such limits with the
visual varies over time, between communities, and even
cultures. There may be no more evocative set of cases to
illustrate how the most basic manner in which the visual can
be culturally determined than those the U.S. Supreme Court
faced when trying to determine the validity and perfection of
Spanish and Mexican land claims in pre-conquest California.
The Spanish government controlled California prior to
1821.46 The Mexican government controlled California from
1821 to 1846,47 when it was seized and controlled by the United
States48 until the latter formally acquired 525,000 square miles
of Mexican territory, including California, from Mexico in 1848
under the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement
with the Republic of Mexico,49 commonly referred to as the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (“Treaty”).50 Under the Treaty,
Mexico received fifteen million dollars in compensation for the
territory.51 Section Ten of the Treaty originally provided for
protection of land grants previously made by the Spanish and
Mexican governments; however, the U.S. Senate deleted that
section before ratifying the Treaty, as many Americans
believed that the land grants constituted the most valuable
land in California.52
the Niwot Sending and Receiving Area Map, and areas designated through
Intergovernmental Agreements with municipalities in Boulder County.”).
46. Myra K. Saunders, California Legal History: A Review of Spanish
and Mexican Legal Institutions, 87 LAW LIBR. J. 487, 488 (1995).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement with the
Republic of Mexico, U.S.-Mex., Jul. 4, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, available at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=009/llsl009.db&recNum=975.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. William Benemann, Nine Treasures: California Legal History
Research in the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 6 CAL.
LEGAL HIST. 251, 258 (2011). All of the approximately 1,400 diseños filed
under the California Land Act are now kept at the University of California,
Berkeley’s
Bancroft
Library.
See
Calisphere,
UNIV. OF CAL.,
http://www.calisphere.universityofcalifornia.edu/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2012)
for copies of a substantial number of the diseños, which may be accessed by
searching “diseno.”
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Seeking a middle-ground between expropriation of all
claims and gaining access to the new state’s riches, the U.S.
Congress passed An Act to Ascertain and Settle the Private
Land Claims in the State of California (“Act”).53 The Act was
intended to adjudicate pre-existing property rights claims
arising from the Spanish and Mexican governments in
California, which totaled between twelve and thirteen million
acres of prime coastal and valley land, most of which were
intended to convince settlement of distant lands, and most of
which operated as cattle ranchos.54 The Act provided a review
mechanism whereby any person claiming land grants from the
Spanish or Mexican governments was to present a claim to an
appointed board of commissioners who assembled all evidence
of such claims.55 If the commissioners verified a claim, the
United States could appeal to the federal district court, and if
the district court upheld the commissioners’ ruling, the United
States could appeal directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.56 For
land claims that were confirmed and survived appeal, the
United States issued a patent57 that established conclusive
ownership between the United States and the claimants, but
not as against third parties.58 The Act provided claimants two
years after the date of the Act to present claims to the
commissioners for consideration; and that all other lands not so
claimed would be “considered as part of the public domain of
the United States.”59
In review of such claims, the United States Supreme Court
early announced in U.S. v. Cambuston60 the requirements for
perfecting a pre-existing Mexican land claim that would be
recognized under the Act. These requirements included
meeting all of the criteria for establishing a land grant under

53. Ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631 (1851) [hereinafter California Land Act].
54. Karen B. Clay, Property Rights and Institutions: Congress and the
California Land Act of 1851, 59 J. OF ECON. HIST. 122, 122-23 (1999).
55. California Land Act § 8, 9 Stat. at 632.
56. Id. §§ 9-10, 9 Stat. at 632-33.
57. Id. § 13, 9 Stat. at 633.
58. Id. § 15, 9 Stat. at 634.
59. See Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. 478 (1865) (describing procedures under
the California Land Act).
60. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 59 (1857).
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Spanish or Mexican rule.61 If the Mexican Governor decided to
grant the land, the diseño was included in a document called
an expediente, which granted title to the land in the diseño.62
61. Id. at 62.
The regulations for the colonization of the Territories of the
Government of Mexico, made 21st November, 1828, in
pursuance of the act of the General Congress, August 18,
1824, provided: 1st. That the Governors of the Territories
should be empowered to grant vacant lands, among others,
to private persons who may ask for them, for the purpose of
cultivating and inhabiting the same. 2d. That every person
soliciting lands shall address to the Governor a petition,
expressing his name, country, and religion, and describing
as distinctly as possible, by means of a map [called a
diseño], the land asked for. 3d. The Governor shall proceed
to obtain the necessary information, whether the petition
contains the proper conditions required by the law of the
18th August, 1824, both as regards the land and the
petitioner, in order that the application may be at once
attended to; or, if it be preferred, the municipal authority
may be consulted, whether there be any objection to the
making of the grant. 4th. This being done, the Governor will
accede or not to such petition, in conformity to the laws on
the subject. 5th. The definitive grant asked for being made,
a document signed by the Governor shall be given, to serve
as a title to the party interested, wherein it must be stated
that the grant is made in exact conformity with the
provisions of the law in virtue of which possession shall be
given. 6th. The necessary record shall be kept, in a book
provided for the purpose, of all the petitions presented and
grants made, with maps of the lands granted, and a
circumstantial report shall be forwarded quarterly to the
Supreme Government.
Id.; see also United States v. Castillero, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 17 (1862)
(describing same).
62. See United States v. Galbraith, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 394, 399 (1862) (“A
diseño or map is a necessary part of every land espediente [sic], and is
distinctly required by the regulations of 1828.”). The Court was not always
consistent in its understanding of what right the expediente granted. In
United States v. Elder, 177 U.S. 104 (1900), the Court collected its partially
contradictory holdings on the role of the expediente. The most technically
precise definition of an expediente was in United States v. Knight's
Administrator, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 227, 245-46 (1861), which stated,
When complete, an espediente [sic] usually consists of the
petition, with the diseño annexed; a marginal decree,
approving the petition; the order of reference to the proper
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Diseños were typically hand-drawn, and sketched out the land
grant in reference to mountains, rivers, beaches, and other
natural monuments. The diseño was rarely surveyed, and
where it was, the Spanish and Mexican method for doing so
could not yield a replicable result. Tradition called for two men
on horseback to:
[T]ake a lariat that was fifty varas in length
(about 137.5 feet). One man would begin at a
stated landmark - the old oak tree at the edge of
the dry creek, the big red rock at the top of the
third hill - and drive in a stake. The second
horseman would ride until the lariat was drawn
tight, and drive in another stake. The procedure
would then be repeated. If the lariat was drawn
through wet grass, it might be stretched and
lengthened, or on a hot day, dried and
contracted. As a result, no two surveys of the
same area ever matched, and descriptions of the
land were frequently so vague that it was not
clear what should be measured in the first
place.63
While the lariat and the diseño were sufficient to claim
land under the Mexican regime, both means of surveying
property looked amateurish, even silly, to the American court.
By the time the diseño cases landed before the Supreme Court,
the United States had nearly three-quarters of a century
invested in a technical system for surveying and conveying
officer, for information; the report of that officer, in
conformity to the order, the decree of concession, and the
copy or a duplicate of the grant. These several papers-that
is, the petition, with the diseño annexed, the order of
reference, the informé, the decree of concession, and the
copy of the grant, appended together in the order
mentioned-constitute a complete espediente [sic], within the
meaning of the Mexican law.
Id. Note that an “expediente” was also sometimes referred to in the Court’s
cases as an “espediente,” which refers to the same document.
63. Benemann, supra note 52, at 259.
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land. While the Mexican government gave away lands in
California subject to privately drawn diseños, the American
system called for surveying land prior to settlement,64 and all
sales or dispositions of public lands to private parties by the
federal government were to be conducted in accordance with
that survey system.65 The Public Land Survey System
(“PLSS”), which is currently in use in most states with the
exclusion of the original thirteen colony states and Texas, was
originally proposed by Thomas Jefferson.66 The Land
Ordinance of 178567 provided for the systematic survey of
public domain lands and the Northwest Ordinance of 178768
established a rectangular survey system. The resulting PLSS
system divided land into six-mile-square townships, each of
which are subdivided into thirty-six one-mile-square sections.
Sections, in turn, can be further subdivided into quarter
sections, quarter-quarter sections, or irregular government
lots. The survey system is maintained through placement of a
series of markers called “monumentation.”69
Mexican claimants seeking to validate California land
grants with hand drawn diseños were met with skepticism of
the courts of their conquerors more accustomed to such
technical surveys. While the American courts ostensibly gave
the same weight to the validity of the diseños as the Mexican
Governor would have done, it is clear the U.S. Supreme Court
found this difficult to do in over seventy cases the Court heard

64. The Public Land Survey System (PLSS), NAT’L ATLAS OF THE U.S.,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
THE
INTERIOR,
http://www.nationalatlas.gov/articles/boundaries/a_plss.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Public Land Survey System].
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. An Ordinance for Ascertaining the Mode of Disposing of Lands in the
Western Territory (May 18, 1785), in 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774-1789 923 (Worthington C. Ford et al. eds., 1933), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?ammem/bdsdcc:@field%28DOCID+@lit%28bdsdcc13201%29%29.
68. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United
States, North-West of the River Ohio (July 13, 1787), in 32 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789 334-43 (Worthington C. Ford et al. eds.,
1936),
available
at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?ammem/bdsdcc:@field%28DOCID+@lit%28bdsdcc22501%29%29.
69. Public Land Survey System, supra note 64.
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involving diseños. For instance, in De Arguello v. United
States,70 a case adjudicating a diseño that claimed most of the
San Francisco peninsula for the descendants of a commander of
the San Francisco presidio, the Court refused to defer to the
diseño.71 (See Figure 1). The Court expressed its frustration,
stating, “[t]he appellants [who were challenging the diseño and
the land claim] have got Las Pulgas,” the subject of the diseño,
“by a valid title, according to the boundaries ascertained by the
proper public authorities, and cannot now be permitted to recur
to vague tradition of a vague and uncertain boundary, to
unsettle the titles to a large territory since granted to others.”72
In other words, the Court ruled for the party whose claim was
established within the Court’s own cultural surveying scheme.
To the eye of the Court, the hand-drawn diseño, with its
sketched references to mountains, rivers, and beaches, was no
match for the rigor of the more precise American survey
system.73

Figure 1. Diseño del Las Pulgas74
70. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 539 (1855).
71. See id. at 546.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Calisphere,
UNIV.
OF
CAL.,
http://content.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb3t1nb14h/?query=Rancho de las (last
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The diseño casts into stark relief the stakes at issue in
cultural relations to the visual in the law of cities: a map
sufficient to convey vast swaths of coastal California in
Mexican California conveyed no legal rights before an
American court accustomed to a technically-accurate and
scientifically-reproducible legal description. On the basis of
ambiguity in a hand-drawn map, the Supreme Court dispensed
with land claims to much of what became California’s most
prosperous areas. This exhibits one way in which the cultural
relationship to the visual in the law of cities manifests itself:
while a map can be useful as a means of conveying land
between parties, the value of the map is subject not only to the
constitutional and statutory constraints upon such maps, but
also the cultural and customary constraints upon what a map
must do. While the rule of law typically prevents constitutional
or statutory changes from eliminating legal rights provided by
maps, larger cultural or customary changes, whether resulting
from revolution, war, or otherwise, can upend the norms of how
visual legal documents are interpreted and thus convey rights.
IV. Second Tableau: Aesthetics and Burnham’s 1909 Plan of
Chicago
This tableau explores the changing relationship between
the aesthetics, or the beauty of the built environment, and the
law of cities. At the heart of this issue lies two questions: first,
the extent to which law ought to regulate development to
achieve a perceived beauty; and second, whether implicit in
regulating beauty is a policy favoring the common good,
property values, an elitist gentility, business, racism, all of the
above, or something more?
The English legal system had to tackle these aesthetic
questions, eventually embedding them in the American legal
inheritance. One prominent example is the role of enclosure
laws in England and the accompanying rise of the picturesque
as an artistic movement. In England, beginning in the
sixteenth century and through to the nineteenth century, a
series of enclosure laws eliminated rural commons areas,
visited Dec. 21, 2012).
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typically used for grazing or growing hay, and instead
“enclosed” them in private property estates owned by elites and
maintained after enclosure solely for the private uses of those
elites.75
The landscape architect Humphry Repton was particularly
skilled at using the enclosure acts to achieve the ideal of the
“picturesque” in landscape design.76 Repton, and others, in
seeking to render the picturesque upon the land, sought to recreate within the newly enclosed estate the “natural” landscape
of the commons that previously existed. The result was an
effort to maintain, through the artifice of the picturesque, the
visual imagery of the previously open commons, but within the
regularized, and private, spaces of the estate.77 In this
application, the picturesque helped to mask—at least to the
elites and perhaps to the society at large—the underlying legal
changes under way in the countryside. The artifice did so by
recreating the feeling previously elicited by the commons and
thus normalizing the dramatic assertion of rights over rural
land by the elites.
In twentieth-century American culture, aesthetics in the
law of cities evolved along several lines, including such
disparate subjects as billboard regulation, project design
review, and historic preservation.78 This article focuses on a
75. See generally John Macarthur, Visual Appropriation and Property in
the Theory of Humphry Repton, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF LAW: LANDSCAPE,
IDENTITY AND REGULATION 49, 49-65 (William Taylor ed., 2006).
76. See id. at 50.
77. Simon Ryan, Picturesque Visions, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES
READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE, supra note 9, at 143, 143.
78. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
129 (1978).
Because this Court has recognized, in a number of settings,
that States and cities may enact land-use restrictions or
controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the
character and desirable aesthetic features of a city
appellants do not contest that New York City's objective of
preserving structures and areas with special historic,
architectural, or cultural significance is an entirely
permissible governmental goal.
Id. (citations omitted); Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 23 U.S.C. § 131
(2012) (controls outdoor advertising along 306,000 miles of Federal-Aid
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series of questions that center around whether a city may raze
a section of town deemed undesirable or, in the parlance of
mid-century redevelopment, “blighted.” Is removal of a
community whose primary offense is its visual appearance a
legitimate concern of the law of cities?79
In this case, we will start with the answer, because it is so
prominent in the evolution of the law of cities. Like many midcentury cities, the District of Columbia sought to condemn and
raze a largely African-American community that it deemed
“blighted”80 in order to build a new community that, it turned
out, would become largely inhabited by white residents.81 The
District of Columbia did have evidence of physical
deterioration—a number of the buildings lacked indoor toilets,
and there were a number of other indices of poverty—but there
were also plenty other buildings in the wrecking ball’s way that
were home to upstanding and profitable businesses.82 Just such
a business was the source of review in the 1954 U.S. Supreme
Court case of Berman v. Parker.83 In that case, the Court held
that the District of Columbia could use its eminent domain
powers to condemn not only the dilapidated properties, but also
those well-functioning buildings in proximity to the blighted
area.84 Further, the Court held:

Primary, Interstate and National Highway System roads).
79. Admittedly, blight determinations technically turned on non-visual
determinations. However, the rationale for blight determinations is often a
formality by which to grade how a place looks to those who do not live there.
80. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954).
81. Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman v. Parker, 42
URB. LAW. 423, 467 (2010).
82. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 30-31; Lavine, supra note 81, at 444.
Out of the entire 550 acre area, 43% of the residences had
only outhouses, 44% did not have showers or baths, 70%
had no central heating, and 21% did not have electricity.
But while its physical attributes may have been lacking,
Southwest was home to about 23,000 residents, and it
provided a lively cultural hub for many of the city’s black
residents and immigrant Jews.
Lavine, supra note 81, at 444.
83. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 31.
84. See id. at 34-35.
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The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual
as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled. In the present case, the
Congress and its authorized agencies have made
determinations that take into account a wide
variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise
them. If those who govern the District of
Columbia decide that the Nation’s Capital should
be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing
in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the
way.85
The idea that the public welfare, and moreover the police
power, includes within it the potential for aesthetic regulation
was buttressed by subsequent decisions of the Court. For
instance, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,86 the Court noted:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few,
and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate
guidelines in a land-use project addressed to
family needs. . . . The police power is not confined
to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy
places. It is ample to lay out zones where family
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet
seclusion and clean air make the area a
sanctuary for people.87
In City of Memphis v. Greene,88 the Court noted, “[t]he
residential interest in comparative tranquility is also

85. Id. at 33 (citations omitted).
86. 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (affirming an ordinance limiting single-family
dwellings to families of not more than two unrelated residents).
87. Id. at 9.
88. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
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unquestionably legitimate. That interest provides support . . .
for the accepted view that a man’s home is his castle.”89
Through these and other cases, the Court established that
aesthetics was within the ambit of police power regulations and
a proper subject for condemnation.
With the clarity of the contemporary approach to
aesthetics established, it is worth returning to perhaps the
most important planning document of the twentieth century to
address aesthetics, the 1909 Plan90 prepared for an
organization of private city boosters, The Commercial Club, by
Daniel Burnham of “make no little plans” fame,91 and architect
Edward Bennet. Perhaps more than any other American
document before or after, the Plan was intent on finding a way
to build a beautiful city. In fact, the movement it launched
across the United States was often referred to by the moniker
“City Beautiful,” with its impetus to civic leaders, as well as
businesses and other private parties, to do their parts to
beautify American cities.92
The concept of city planning was in its infancy when the
Plan was set forth; the City of Chicago had no planning
department or staff, and the document itself tells us that plan
was the result of “disinterested men of wide experience,” most
of which were leaders in the business community, and was
drafted over thirty months.93 The City Beautiful movement,
which became closely allied to both the Plan and Burnham
personally, stated a “prosperity gospel”94 for bringing
aesthetics—beauty—to city form. Burnham wrote:

89. Id. at 127.
90. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 5.
91. It is arguable whether Burnham ever actually uttered the words for
which he is posthumously famous. See THOMAS S. HINES, BURNHAM OF
CHICAGO: ARCHITECT AND PLANNER 401 n.8 (2d ed. 2009) (1974).
92. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 5, at 8.
93. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 5, at 2.
94. The idea largely holds that God blesses those favored with material
wealth. Compare Cathleen Falsani, The Prosperity Gospel, WASH. POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/opinions/outlook/worstideas/prosperity-gospel.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2012), with PLAN OF
CHICAGO, supra note 5, at 4 (“[T]he city has a dignity to be maintained; and
good order is essential to material advancement.”).
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The experience of other cities both ancient and
modern, both abroad and at home, teaches
Chicago that the way to true greatness and
continued prosperity lies in making the city
convenient and healthful for the ever-increasing
numbers of its citizens; that civic beauty satisfies
a craving of human nature so deep and so
compelling that people will travel far to find and
enjoy it; that the orderly arrangement of the fine
buildings and monuments brings fame and
wealth to the city; and that the cities which truly
exercise dominion rule by reason of their appeal
to the higher emotions of the human mind. The
problem for Chicago, therefore, resolves itself
into making the best use of a situation, the
central location and resources of which have
already drawn together millions of people, and
are clearly destined to assemble many times that
number; and planning for that civic development
which promotes present content and insures
permanence.95
As part of the aesthetic vision, Burnham spoke of the Plan as
treating the city with a “comprehensive plan” that would
address the city as an “organic whole,” a concept then new to
American cities.96 The Plan states several factors that
convinced these private civic leaders that they had to engage
the idea of city planning.97 To achieve its goals, the proposal
95. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 5, at 30.
96. Id. at 28-29; see also id. at 121 (providing for visions of the
improvement of the Lake front; the creation of a system of highways outside
the city; the improvement of railway terminals, and the development of a
complete traction system for both freight and passengers; the acquisition of
an outer park system, and of parkway circuits; the systematic arrangement of
the streets and avenues within the city, in order to facilitate the movement to
and from the business district; and the development of centers of intellectual
life and of civic administration, so related as to give coherence and unity to
the city.).
97. Id. at 14 (noting that “city planning, in the sense of regarding the
city as an organic whole and of developing its various units with reference to
their relations one to another,” had its origins in Paris and that Paris was the
most accomplished in this art).
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called for a wide array of public infrastructure projects, but
perhaps none was as dramatic as an effort to cut through the
city’s existing street forms and build large boulevards
reminiscent of what Haussmann had accomplished in Paris,
and which had been widely emulated in European cities.98 (See
Figure 2).

Figure 2. Plan of Chicago99
The Plan was heavily influenced by Haussmann’s work in
Paris, noting that “[t]he task which Haussmann accomplished
for Paris corresponds with the work which must be done for
Chicago, in order to overcome the intolerable conditions which
invariably arise from a rapid growth of population.”100 If
Haussmann could take Paris’s medieval core and turn it into a
home for grand boulevards, then such plans were not beyond
the reach of a can-do city like Chicago.

98. Id. at 11-18.
99. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 5, at 93.
100. Id. at 18.
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Similarly, the origins of the Plan could be traced to other
standard bearers of civic beauty at the time. The Plan states
that its origins “can be traced directly to the World’s
Columbian Exposition” held in 1893,101 which brought to the
city, if only in plaster-of-Paris casts, a vision and scale of
grandeur that the post-fire Chicago of the late nineteenthcentury had not imagined possible.
In addition, the city was facing staggering growth—during
the second half of the nineteenth century, the population of
Chicago increased from thirty thousand to two million102—and
a grand plan seemed essential for practical purposes. That
growth also led business leaders of Chicago to feel an air of
inevitability about the city’s destiny for greatness. It was not
good enough that the city should be wealthy, but they now also
sought it to have the prestige of a world-class city.103 The Plan
notes that the area of the Middle West that is the “domain over
which Chicago holds primacy is larger than Austria-Hungary,
or Germany or France;”104 and that expectations were such that
in fifty years the city’s population will “be larger than London:
that is, larger than any existing city.”105 To secure the city’s
prominence befitting its size, the Plan implores the City’s
business leaders that:

101. Id. at 4.
102. Id. at 32.
103. See, e.g., id. at 34.
It is not in the spirit of boasting that these facts are stated,
but rather to show the responsibility which the very preeminence of the city imposes, and the necessity for
establishing and maintaining those standards of commercial
integrity, of taste, and of knowledge which are the
prerequisites of lasting success, and the only real
satisfaction of the human mind. The constant struggle of
civilization is to know and to attain the highest good; and
the city which brings about the best conditions of life
becomes the most prosperous.
Id.
104. Id. at 32.
105. Id. at 33.
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Conditions in Chicago are such as to repel
outsiders and drive away those who are free to
go. The cream of our own earnings should be
spent here, while the city should become a
magnet, drawing to us those who wish to enjoy
life. The change would mean prosperity,
effective, certain, and forever continuous.”106
What was needed was something to draw those people to the
City and that was a beautiful city.
As much as the Plan was a visionary document, it was also
practical. Foremost among the practical considerations were
legal questions about how, under the American legal system,
Chicago could build grand boulevards like Haussmann’s Paris,
a feat which had been accomplished under the power of an
emperor. Behind the eye-catching visual renderings of the
Chicago that could be, the Plan also provided a detailed legal
analysis of the powers necessary to bring the Plan to
fruition.107 Walter F. Fisher, who later became U.S. Secretary
of the Interior, drafted the legal analysis,108 which addressed in
great detail the legal question of aesthetics. If a city were to
make itself beautiful, and if that beauty required cutting
through the fabric of the city as in Haussmann’s Paris, it would
also mean condemning neighborhoods functioning fine now, but
which were not in line with the larger, city-wide plan. With
regard to condemnation to achieve the purposes of the Plan,
Fisher noted:
The police power is adequate to the destruction,
without recompense, of single buildings which
are insanitary or unsafe, but the legislature of
Illinois has not yet undertaken to go further and
license the condemnation
by municipal
authorities of congested or unwholesome areas
under the power of eminent domain. . . .
. . . It may be doubted, however, whether the
106. Id. at 124.
107. See generally id. at 125-54.
108. Id. at 126.
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courts would sustain as constitutional a statute
designed to appropriate a whole congested area
merely for the purpose of renovating it.109
Fisher’s analysis, of course, came almost fifty years prior to
Berman, and in considering almost identical factual situations,
Fisher concluded that the law of aesthetics in his time did not
clearly permit the wholesale removal of a community, the very
such action approved in Berman.110 Now, a century later, and
after Kelo v. City of New London,111 which affirmed Berman’s
broad interpretation of the police power,112 it is remarkable to
read such timidity toward aesthetic regulation in a document
that is the basis of the City Beautiful movement.
It must be remembered, however, that the Plan was
written during a time that pre-dated most of the twentiethcentury planning apparatus—the Plan was more than a decade
prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s blessing of zoning in the
1925 case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company113 or
the widespread adoption of Zoning Enabling Acts in the
1920s.114 In fact, the legal analysis in the Plan states that it is
unclear whether typical zoning requirements, much less design
review requirements typical today, would be permitted at the
time of the Plan:
No question is made but that the city council has
power to regulate the height of buildings with a
view to health and public safety; but it may be
doubted whether the police power would justify
109. Id. at 151.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
111. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
112. Id. at 501.
113. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
114. For a historical background of such acts see Stuart Meck, Model
Planning and Zoning Legislation: A Short History, in 1 AM. PLAN. ASS’N,
MODERNIZING STATE PLANNING STATUTES: THE GROWING SMART WORKING
PAPERS,
1,
1-4
(1996),
available
at
http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/PAS462.pdf; and Ruth Knack et
al., The Real Story Behind the Standard Planning and Zoning Acts of the
1920s, 48 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (1996), available at
http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/LULZDFeb96.pdf.
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the municipal authorities in imposing more
rigorous restrictions upon the character of
buildings to be constructed along boulevards and
around parks than in other parts of the city.115
This passage of the Plan shows that its authors felt uncertain
whether land use controls common today, such as those
exercised by many design review boards over facades, could be
legally sustained. The Plan’s legal reasoning on aesthetics is, in
other words, as far as we can imagine from the post-Berman,
and post-Kelo, reality where aesthetic regulations proliferate
not only over the facades of buildings, but of transient
structures like billboards. In its time, though, the Plan’s legal
statement was merely a statement of the existing law. In this
way, the Plan and Berman operate as bookends for a time
when the law of cities was evolving in its approach to the
regulation of beauty.
If the Plan was one of America’s first planning document
to prominently align itself with the import of making a city
beautiful, it also exhibited a hesitancy, even a restraint, in its
legal case for a city’s ability to engage in the type of activity it
sought to engender. By the time of Berman, however, the Court
was not only willing to offer a resounding legal defense of
aesthetic regulation, but also willing to offer a defense to a
city’s power to condemn functioning buildings in neighborhoods
that were blighted.116 In just four decades, the law evolved to
accept that building and protecting beautiful cities was a
proper use of governmental power, even in democracies.
Unresolved in the question of aesthetics regulation are the
social implications of beautiful cities. While the Plan and the
City Beautiful-era projects led to some of the most beloved
public works projects in American history,117 post-Berman
redevelopment projects led to innumerable examples of failed
modernist buildings, bleak plazas, and disruptive street
patterns.118 Aesthetic regulation, in other words, always has a
115. PLAN OF CHICAGO, supra note 5, at 141.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
117. Examples of such projects include Chicago’s Michigan Avenue,
Philadelphia’s Museum of Art, and San Francisco’s Civic Center.
118. Examples of such projects include Albany’s Empire State Plaza,
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social cost to those in the way of progress, but the result of
aesthetic regulation is not always beauty. And thus the
regulation of aesthetics through law establishes itself as
something other than a philosophical inquiry into beauty’s
origins and tastes. Instead, aesthetics in law has become first a
tool to destructive power, and only with great labor does it
create a city beautiful to both its inhabitants and creators.
V. Third Tableau: Production of Space and Visual Codes
“The user’s space is lived—not represented (or conceived).” 119
–Henri Lefebvre
This tableau explores a more theoretical approach to the
law of cities and the visual: whether visual legal codes, such as
those used in San Francisco’s new Treasure Island
development plans, can answer a long-standing need of the law
of cities to prioritize the perspective of the individual in the
production of space.
The legal codes that define the way cities evolve are bound
by the intellectual traditions in which they arose. For Richard
Sennett, these codes exist within a crossfire between the
“Christian city,” which “put great value on the inside—on
shelter within buildings as on inner experiences,” and the
“Enlightenment city,” which “sought to take people outside—
but on to fields and forests rather than streets filled with
jostling crowds.”120 Sennett defines the issue with this
ideological division:
In the face of larger differences in the city they
tend to withdraw to the local, intimate,
communal scale. Those who work visually and at
a larger scale find it as difficult to organize
diverse urban scenes. . . . The modern planner
San Francisco’s Western Addition, and Fort Worth’s Tarrant County
Convention Center.
119. HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 362 (Donald NicholsonSmith trans., 1991) (1974).
120. SENNETT, supra note 1, at 97.
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lacks visual precepts for how races might be
mixed in public places, or how to orchestrate the
zoning and design of streets so that economically
mixed uses work well. It is equally obscure how
to design house projects and schools that mix
races, classes, or ages. Human diversity seems
something beyond the powers of human
design.121
For Sennett, the problem with the existing planning state is
that its tools, such as traditional zoning, are ill-equipped to
address or build a city with economic or racial diversity. Others
have seen the dilemma of abstraction in codes planning for
cities as inherent in the modern approach to law itself. Some
have argued that the Western legal project is underwritten by
an organized forgetting of the spaces and places of social life.122
For such commentators, the English common law crafted by
early modernists such as Edward Coke sought to create a
unitary legal structure that, in its wake, denied and subjugated
local laws that, in turn, reflected local communities.123 Another
commentator noted that:
When Blackstone instructed the teacher of
English law to consider his course as “a general
map of the law, marking out the shape of the
country, its connexions and boundaries, its
greater divisions and principal cities,” he also
counseled that “it is not his business to describe
minutely the subordinate limits, or to fix the
longitude and latitude of every inconsiderable
hamlet.” In so doing, he neatly expressed the
tendency of law to erase spatial specificity and
local difference in the name of an ordered and
apparently coherent unity. In its very
constitution, then, law appears to have an
121. Id. at 97-98.
122. Nicholas Blomley, From “What?” to “So What?”: Law and
Geography in Retrospect, in 5 LAW AND GEOGRAPHY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES
19, 25 (Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds., 2003).
123. Id.
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important, if negative, relation to space.124
This underlying abstraction of modern law has significant
ramifications for the law of cities, for if the creation of modern
law has subjugated the specific to the general, then any effort
in the law of cities to plan for a specific neighborhood or
community must offer an alternative narrative to that of Coke
and Blackstone.
One approach to the local’s argument for place-based law
arises in the law and geography movement. For instance, Nick
Johnson and John Wightman have argued that the “where” of
law is relevant in two ways: the “nexus between spatial
location and the relevant persons is established in the law” and
“where location can be seen to affect the content of the legal
rights and duties.”125 In addition, they argue that there are
three features of land that distinguish it from other things in
which law recognizes property rights: (i) land remains,
although structures on the land may be removed or replaced;
(ii) the supply of land is fixed; and (iii) land is fixed in place,
and thus “all land stands in a permanent spatial relationship
to all other land.”126 The permanence and fixed supply of land
impose a “stuckness” on the property owner, for while there is
ostensibly a market for land, individuals are “stuck” to
individual parcels to the extent they have invested financially
in a business or residence, or to the extent that “rootedness”
has developed in relationships to neighbors or networks of
suppliers.127 It is these non-legal attachments that create
“stuckness” as much as the law itself.128 In acknowledgment of
this “stuckness,” the legal geographies movement seeks to open
again the door, closed to local laws built on local knowledge,
shut so long ago.129 Doing so “has the capacity to release law
124. Id.
125. Nick Johnson & John Wightman, Spatial Dimensions of Private
Law, in 5 LAW AND GEOGRAPHY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 122, at 35,
36.
126. See id. at 49.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. See Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison, Connecting Law and
Geography, in 5 LAW AND GEOGRAPHY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 122,
at 3, 3 (“Context is everything. The conviction that law can properly be
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from its (imposed and self-imposed) confinement as ‘word’
(interpretation, meaning, discourse) and to show ‘the legal at
work in the world,’ a world dominates by the physical (places,
landscapes, spatialities, natures).”130
But perhaps no one has examined the question of how the
abstractions of law affect the planning of cities more than the
French philosopher Henri Lefebvre. Abstractions of law, to
Lefebvre, are the tools that permit the creation of abstract
spaces, spaces that deny an integrity to the local. Of such
abstract space, Lefebvre has written, similar to Sennett, that it
is a “tool of domination” that
asphyxiates whatever is conceived within it and
then strives to emerge. . . . This space is a lethal
one which destroys the historical conditions that
gave rise to it, its own (internal) differences, and
any such differences that show signs of
developing, in order to impose an abstract
homogeneity.131
Legal abstractions stifle not only diversity, but also the
individual’s ability to be recognized in the planning process.
understood only be reference to its place in, and relationship to, social,
economic, political, and ecological systems underpins contemporary critical
and socio-legal scholarship.”); id. at 4 (“[W]hereas the abstract application of
legal doctrine and principles, and even the wholesale transplantation of a
legal regime, might be viewed as unproblematic from a positivist perspective,
a ‘Geography in Law’ approach suggest that law must make room for local
conditions and experience, and recognize the changing of laws to work in local
contexts. The identification here is with ‘local legal universes,’ or ‘legal
localization’—forms of regulation rooted in local conditions of existence.”).
130. Id. at 5; see also id. at 6 (“If space is a dominant currency of
geography, then the boundaries of space are all-important, particularly when
created or reinforced, by the concepts of law, such as jurisdiction, territory,
and legality.”); Robert Mohr, Territory, Landscape and Law in Three Images
of the Basque Country, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF LAW: LANDSCAPE, IDENTITY AND
REGULATION,
supra
note
75,
at
17,
29,
available
at
http://works.bepress.com/rmohr/1/ (“Boundaries and how we draw them are
fundamental to law and to a definition of law as jurisdiction. This analysis
reminds us that those boundaries can be contested or refused, and may be
unclear and overlapping. The boundaries can be seen to be less important
than the spaces they purport to contain.”).
131. LEFEBVRE, supra note 119, at 370.
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The zoning map, for instance, uses perfect rationality to divide
the city into a hierarchy of zones and uses without any
perceived recognition of what exists in a place, or the
individual’s desires for that place.
This rise of abstract space, and abstraction’s laws, and its
purpose, have a history132 that Lefebvre traces, in their
European context, to codes that evolved out of the colloquial
building styles of towns, each of which developed its own style
of architecture.133 Imagine the small European town, where
each house has its own name, perhaps a place like Queen
Camel in the Somerset region of England, where instead of
numbers, homes have names, such as “Caburn.” However,
these local architectural codes were ultimately subsumed into
larger, national codes, which stripped the locality of its
autonomy and history, but gave the entirety of the region a
greater sense of architectural unity and “charm.”134 Here we
might imagine the rise of the six-floor apartment building
along the boulevards in Haussmann’s Paris, and its ceaseless
repetition throughout that city and throughout France and
other European capitals. The deployment of such a spatial
code, in Lefebvre’s view,
is not simply a means of reading or interpreting
space: rather it is a means of living in that space,
of understanding it, and of producing it. As such
it brings together verbal signs (words and
sentences, along with the meaning invested in

132. Id. at 44.
If architects (and urban planners) do indeed have a
representation of space, whence does it derive? Whose
interests are served when it becomes ‘operational’? As to
whether or not ‘inhabitants’ possess a representational
space, if we arrive at an affirmative answer, we shall be
well on the way to dispelling a curious misunderstanding
(which is not to say that this misunderstanding will
disappear in social and political practice).
Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 47-48.
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them by a signifying process) and non-verbal
signs (music, sounds, evocations, architectural
constructions).135
Without that code of the apartment building, in other words,
the culture of the boulevard would not have evolved, much less
the culture of the café, the flaneur, or even the bourgeoisie. It is
no surprise that the French student rebellion of 1968 built fires
and road blocks on the boulevards, for those straight streets
were the physical embodiment of a law of cities that prioritized
the abstractions of a new world order over the individuals who
were the neighborhood’s previous tenants.
Beyond simply the codes of architecture, the law of cities
further abstracted the growth of the city. Lefebvre writes:
It was at this juncture that the idea of
housing began to take on definition, along with
its corollaries: minimal living-space, as
quantified in terms of modular units and speed of
access; likewise minimal facilities and a
programmed environment. What was actually
being defined here, by dint of successive
approximations, was the lowest possible
threshold of tolerability.136
Suburbs were planned, and here again, “[t]he idea of the ‘bare
minimum’ was no less in evidence. Suburban houses and ‘new
towns’ came close to the lowest possible threshold of
sociability—the point beyond which survival would be
impossible because all social life would have disappeared.”137
The allure of the rational further abstracted spatial
distinctions and divisions. Zoning was chief among these tools,
135. Id.
136. Id. at 316.
137. Id. The history of suburbs in Europe differs in some European cities
from the United States. In places such as Paris, high-rises of affordable
housing projects predominate. However, what Europeans refer to as “new
towns” are similar to typical American suburban communities both in spatial
planning requirements, and the general sentiments that often prevail in
those communities, including an automobile-oriented lifestyle.
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with “[t]he assignment of functions, and the way functions are
actually distributed ‘on the ground,’ becomes indistinguishable
from the kind of analytical activity that discerns differences.”138
These differences become tools for discrimination in the guise
of rational judgment.139 In defiance of this abstraction,
Lefebvre notes that, “The user’s space is lived not represented
(or conceived). When compared with the abstract space of the
experts (architects, urbanists, planners), the space of the
everyday activities of users is a concrete one, which is to say,
subjective.”140
Lefebvre’s ire falls upon the rise of the planning tradition,
with its emphasis on the abstracting tools of comprehensive
plans, general plans, and zoning. With these tools, so much of
life was reduced to their basic functions—or uses—and each
prescribed a size, with dimensions defined by setbacks and
other highly technical rationale for an orderly city. These tools
138. Id. at 317.
139. Id. at 318.
Abstract space is thus repressive in essence and par
excellence—but thanks to its versatility it is repressive in a
peculiarly artful way: its intrinsic repressiveness may be
manifested alternatively through reduction, through
(functional) localization, through the imposition of hierarchy
and segregation - or through art. The fact of viewing from
afar, of contemplating what has been torn apart, of
arranging ‘viewpoints’ and ‘perspectives’, [sic] can (in the
most favourable [sic] cases) change the effects of a strategy
into aesthetic objects. Such art objects, though generally
abstract, which is to say non-figurative, nevertheless play a
figurative role in that they are truly admirable
representations of a ‘surrounding’ space that effectively kills
the surroundings. All of this corresponds only too well to
that urbanism of maquettes and overall plans which is the
perfect complement to the planning of sewers and public
works: the creator’s gaze lights at will and to his heart’s
content on ‘volumes’; but this is a fake lucidity, one which
misapprehends both the social practice of the ‘users’ and the
ideology that it itself enshrines. None of which prevents it in
the slightest degree from presiding over the spectacle, and
forging the unity into which all the programmed fragments
must be integrated, no matter what the cost.
Id.
140. Id. at 362.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/5

34

MILLER

Final

2013]

2/28/2013 10:36 PM

THE VISUAL AND THE LAW OF CITIES

217

inevitably became the basis for discrimination. For instance,
the hierarchy of uses in traditional zoning schemes prioritized
single-family homes and thus placed apartment buildings, and
thus large sections of the population, typically poor, next to
industrial uses that exposed them to health risks.141 Similarly,
definitions of appropriate neighborhoods for mortgage loans
turned on factors like the prevalence of rental units in a
neighborhood or the prevalence of racial diversity, which were
deemed “risk factors,” and thus prevented minorities from
accessing mortgages and further exacerbated segregation of the
races.142
In recognition of these logistical and social failures of
traditional zoning structures, an increasing number of
jurisdictions are experimenting with visual codes that regulate
only the form of the built environment, but not its use. The
radical proposition of these codes should not be
underestimated, for they do something law has loathed to do:
place the visual at center of the law of cities. In these new
visual codes, while accompanied by text, it is often the visual
diagram itself that conveys the regulations that define
proposed development.
A vivid contemporary example of this new effort to address
the vices of abstraction are the codes developed by the City and
County of San Francisco for a major development to occur on
Treasure Island (a small island connected to the City and
Oakland by bridges and located in San Francisco Bay).
Treasure Island was long a Navy site.143 When the Navy closed
operations there in 1997,144 Treasure Island was transferred
from the Navy to the City of San Francisco for $105 million145
141. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND
USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 4.3(C) (2007).
142. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION
OF THE UNITED STATES 197-203 (1985) (discussing “red-lining”).
143. Former Naval Station Treasure Island, U.S. NAVAL FACILITIES
ENG’G COMMAND, http://www.bracpmo.navy.mil/basepage.aspx?baseid=44
(last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
144. Id.
145. John Cote, City to Get Treasure Island for $105 Million, S.F.
CHRON.
(Dec.
17,
2009,
4:00
AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/12/16/BA6R1B5BR3.DTL; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of Navy BRAC Program Mgmt. Off. W., Navy and City of San Francisco
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and an agreement signed in 2010.146
The City has proposed to develop the island in one master
plan. The proposed fifteen-year development147 is essentially a
new town including: up to 8,000 homes, 140,000 square feet of
commercial space, and 100,000 square feet of office space; three
hotels; a marina and ferry service to San Francisco; and three
hundred acres of parks and open space.148
In preparing planning codes for this project, the City
developed a skeleton planning code text that was accompanied
by a massive set of drawings entitled the “Treasure Island +
Yerba Buena Island Design for Development” (“Design for
Development”) plan, which was specifically incorporated into
the San Francisco Planning Code.149 Further, the City’s
Planning Code specifically stated that development in the
special use district governing Treasure Island “shall be
regulated by the controls contained [in the Planning Code] and
in the Design for Development . . . .”150 The zoning designations
in the Code refer back to the Design for Development
designations and images;151 the “tidelands trust” designating
public trust lands is delineated in drawings in Design for

Agree to Treasure Island Conveyance Terms (Dec. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.bracpmo.navy.mil/base_docs/treasure_island/documents/press_rel
eases/BRAC_PMO_TreasureIsland_release_v16DEC1630.pdf.
146. John Cote & Rachel Gordon, Deal on Transfer of Treasure Island,
S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 18, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/08/17/BA851EVGB7.DTL.
147. See TREASURE IS. DEV. AUTH., DISPOSITION AND DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENT,
EXHIBIT
JJ
(2011),
available
at
http://www.sftreasureisland.org/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=10
56.
148. Treasure Island Development Highlights, CITY & CNTY. OF S.F.
TREASURE
I S.
DEV.
AUTH.,
http://www.sftreasureisland.org/index.aspx?page=361 (last visited Oct. 17,
2012).
149. S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 249.52(d) (2011), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/California/planning/planningcode?f=
templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:sanfrancisco_ca$sync=1;
TREASURE IS. DEV. AUTH., TREASURE ISLAND AND YERBA BUENA ISLAND DESIGN
FOR DEVELOPMENT (2011) [hereinafter DESIGN FOR DEVELOPMENT], available at
http://sftreasureisland.org/ftp/devdocs/D4D/12282011_FinalTI%20D4D(Date0
6282011).pdf.
150. PLANNING § 249.52(e).
151. Id. § 249.52(e)(1).
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Development;152 interim uses must be consistent with Design
for Development;153 height is measured as provided in Design
for Development;154 tower bulk massing is described by
diagrams in Design for Development;155 historic resources are
designated and their treatment specified in Design for
Development;156 and building permits must be consistent with
Design for Development.157 In short, every significant aspect of
the planning of this monstrous project will refer back, at least
in part, to a code that has, at its core, a set of illustrated
diagrams that convey essential information about the form of
the development. Further, the Code also limits the Planning
Director’s ability to approve or disapprove of a project to the
“qualitative Standards and Guidelines” of Design for
Development.158 A Development Agreement, which binds both
the City and the developer, underscores Design for
Development, and prevents the Planning Commission from
imposing conditions of approval that conflict with Design for
Development.159 As such, the Design for Development
document is, more than any text, a true picture of what is to be
built—or more accurately, what must be built, if anything is to
be built at all—than any text could provide. (See Figure 3).
How will the law respond to placing the visual at the core
of the legal code? Despite the increasing prevalence of such
visual codes, there has been no significant litigation of a visual
code at this writing.160 While the law of cities has canons of
construction to interpret texts, it has no such canons for
making sense of the visual. It is hard to imagine that a case
alleging vagueness, or ambiguity, or some violation of a due
152. Id. § 249.52(e)(1).
153. Id. § 249.52(e)(4).
154. Id. § 249.52(e)(6)(A).
155. Id. § 249.52(e)(6)(C); DESIGN FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 149, §
Y4.5.5, at 261.
156. PLANNING § 249.52(g)(5)(D).
157. Id. § 249.52(g)(6).
158. Id. § 249.52(g)(4)(C).
159. Id. § 249.52(g)(4)(D)(ii).
160. In a review of state and federal cases conducted on July 16, 2012,
there was only an ancillary mention that there was an application for formbased code in Litman v. Toll Bros., Inc., 263 F. App’x 269, 271(4th Cir. 2008),
which turned on a real estate dispute.
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process right, is not inevitable. At that time, the courts will
have to decide whether the visual can accurately convey law in
a manner that meets the constitutional and statutory
requirements for regulations, or whether the visual shall
remain disfavored in the eyes of the law.
Beyond the visual’s ability to convey legal standards in a
manner that meets such constitutional and statutory
requirements, the law of cities must evaluate whether these
new visual codes succeed in addressing the challenges to placemaking proffered by Sennett,161 legal geography,162 and
Lefebvre.163 Do visual codes, in any manner, advance questions
of diversity, do they advance the need to place the individual in
context, or are these visual codes simply another form of
zoning’s abstractions already created? Treasure Island’s codes
are instructive. The basis for residential plans is still the unit;
the spaces are still segregated by uses; and the uses are
regulated by zoning classifications. These basic tenets of
space’s abstraction to which Lefebvre objected remain. But the
Treasure Island visual codes do add specificity to the planning
experience, and moreover, that specificity is aimed at seeking a
human scale. Drawings that convey legally actionable setback
requirements feature people in them walking their dogs.
Renderings of the experience on the street, rather than the
view of the structures from on high, dominate the Treasure
Island’s codes. These may be simply the visual’s equivalent of
rhetorical devices to smooth over planning’s fundamental
abstractions of space; however, by simply lowering the angle of
view to the street from on high, the Treasure Island code offers
a chance to speculate about the development’s future as a lived
experience rather than as an architect’s, or a planner’s,
conception. If we presume that such projects, and the scale of
such projects, are inevitable in this era, then the use of visual
codes may be simply the best approach available to ensure the
perspective of the individual—the city as lived experience—is
the primary objective of the planning process.

161. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
162. See supra notes 1252-31 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
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Figure 3. Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island Design for
Development164
VI. Fourth Tableau: Representation of Space and Edward
Hopper
“Many are the cities . . . which elude the gaze of all, except the
man who catches them by surprise.” 165–Italo Calvino
In this final tableau, the article turns to the relation
between the law of cities and the visual arts. In a sense, the
turn to the visual arts is a natural extension of the law and
literature movement. Peter Brooks has written:
The law and literature movement has arisen in
large part from those who believe that law needs
to be accountable to more than itself, to more
than the legal institution, its languages and
rituals. It needs to be tested against the realm of
human value to which literature speaks—not in
any simple sense of moral uplift but in its

164. DESIGN FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 149, at 271.
165. ITALO CALVINO, INVISIBLE CITIES 24 (William Weaver trans., 1974)
(1972).
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address to the human condition.”166
Perhaps more than literature, though, the visual arts generally
and especially paintings focusing on cities as subjects, can play
a similar role for the law of cities because what this body of law
produces and regulates is so tangible: the place in which we
live, which is physical. In considering the role that the visual
arts can play for the law of cities, this article will first seek to
explore the nature of landscape painting, its choices and
rhetorics, as analyzed by philosopher Edward Casey, before
turning to the paintings of Edward Hopper, as an example of
how the visual arts can dialogue with the law of cities.
Casey starts from the premise that “[t]he problem of
representing landscape can be seen as a quandary of
containment.”167 The experience the landscape painter seeks to
portray goes beyond what could ever be adequately presented
on the canvas, both in size and also in feeling.168 As Casey puts
it, “How can the decisively determinate [of the picture frame]
contain the inestimably indeterminate?”169 As a result,
“[p]ainterly representations are genuine presentations. They
seek to present, not to represent; they strive to show, not to
replicate.”170 Casey argues that the landscape painting is not
merely a recordation of a particular scene, but rather the
landscape painter using memory of the entire region in order to
present the “placial specificity and felt vicinage.”171 Casey
argues further:
To know a region is to be fully acquainted with it
as it is spread out in space (i.e., as visible from
“numerous angles”) and as it is distended in time
166. Peter Brooks, Literature as Law’s Other, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
349, 356 (2010).
167. EDWARD S. CASEY, REPRESENTING PLACE: LANDSCAPE PAINTING &
MAPS 7 (2002) (emphasis in original).
168. See id. (“[T]he issue is how something that, by its very nature,
overflows ordinary perception can be represented by something else that, by
its very nature, can only present itself to the viewer as a discrete object with
definite dimensions and often within a delimited frame.”)
169. Id.
170. Id. at 18.
171. Id. at 75.
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(i.e., as it changes “over time”). . . . To know a
region is also to be able to remember it. . . . More
important still is the fact that only through
memory is knowledge of an entire region
sustained. We encounter here a quite
fundamental condition of representability, a
condition of painting any landscape that conveys
more than a momentary glimpse of its layout.
Confronted with the spatially and temporally
expansive character of a given region, a
landscape painter draws upon his or her memory
of numerous experiences of that region in order
to
hold
together
otherwise
disparate
experiences—and to be adequate to the
complexity of the region itself.172
The painter then uses these multiple experiences and histories
of experience in the region to put into one painting the
experience of the entirety of that place.173 The particulars of the
painting—rocks, trees, streets, what have you—are not simply
representations of a specific place, but of the region itself.174 As
such, the physical objects in landscape painting can have their
shape varied by apparent size, position, and the shape and size
of the canvas.175

172. Id. at 76.
173. Id. at 81.
Just as it is possible to remember the same thing but in
different ways—for example, with varying emotional
tonalities—so the painter of a region may render the leading
features of its constituent places in various versions. These
versions reinstate one and the same scene, a given haunt, as
it presents itself in several acts of perceiving as well as in
the history of the painter’s remembrances.
Id.; see also id. at 89 (“The place at stake in regional re-implacement cannot
be reduced to position or ‘simple location.’”); id. at 90 (“To capture the
sublimity of a natural scene, the landscape painter must anchor experience
and memory and imagination in representations that are as place-specific as
they are region-reflective.”).
174. Id. at 82.
175. Id. at 83-84.
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Edward Hopper illustrates Casey’s vision of how paintings
work with space, and also how the law of cities and the visual
arts can speak to each other. Hopper was one of the twentieth
century’s great “realist” painters, so labeled because he did not
indulge in the decade’s more popular schools of abstraction.176
His prolific work spanned the century’s first six decades and
focused primarily on city street scenes in New York City;
however, he also painted rural street scenes, railroads,
lighthouses in Maine, and rural scenes near his summer house
near Truro, Massachusetts, on Cape Cod, and around
Gloucester, Massachusetts.177 He painted where he lived, and
occasionally, where he travelled, such as Paris in his early
years, as well as on later trips to the American South and
West.178
Hopper’s method of painting was evocative of Casey’s
notion that the landscape artist is not simply representing a
particular landscape, but instead interpreting the landscape
through the artist’s personal understanding of the larger
region. Some art critics during Hopper’s life viewed his work
essentially as photography.179 From early in Hopper’s career up
to this day, a cottage industry has emerged trying to find the
exact location and angle of Hopper’s paintings. While some
locations can be found that are remarkably similar to Hopper’s
paintings, there is always a variation—sometimes small,

176. See GAIL LEVIN, EDWARD HOPPER: AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY 187
(1995) [hereinafter HOPPER BIOGRAPHY]. Levin’s book is far-and-away the
most influential, and most-cited biography of Hopper, and so is used
extensively for biographical information in this article.
177. See generally id.
178. Id. at 48-70 (Paris), 221-22 (Charleston, S.C.), 190-93 (Sante Fe,
N.M.), 337-42 (American West).
179. HOPPER BIOGRAPHY, supra note 176, at 396. Clement Greenberg,
who had championed the Abstract Expressionists, wrote in the Nation that
Hoppers painting is essentially photography, and it is
literary in the way that the best photography is. Like
Walker Evans’s and Weegee’s art, it triumphs over
inadequacies of the physical medium. . . . Hopper simply
happens to be a bad painter. But if he were a better painter,
he would, most likely, not be so superior an artist.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/5
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sometimes large—between what is there in real life, and what
is there in Hopper’s painting.180 In a telling anecdote, John
Maass, discovered two houses in Haverstraw, just north of
Nyack, New York, and wrote to Hopper in the mid-1950s to
inquire about the exact location of the house that appears in
Hopper’s 1925 House by the Railroad.181 Jo, Hopper’s wife,
responded to Maass, “[h]e did it out of his head. He has seen so
many of them.”182 This was not unusual for Hopper, who
routinely painted indoors and from memory, but always based
upon an intense study of his subject region.183
As Casey proposed of landscape painters generally, Hopper
long maintained that the purpose of painting, even of
landscapes of seemingly recognizable locations, was primarily
one of expressing an artist’s interior thoughts and feelings.184
In one of his few statements on the nature of art, Hopper
wrote:
Great art is the outward expression of an inner
life in the artist, and this inner life will result in
his personal vision of the world. No amount of
skillful invention can replace the essential
element of imagination. One of the weaknesses of
much abstract painting is the attempt to
180. See, e.g., Gail Albert Halaban, The Original Hoppers, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE
(July
20,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/07/22/magazine/hopper-houses.html
(comparing Hopper paintings and photographs of subjects of same).
181. HOPPER BIOGRAPHY, supra note 176, at 195.
182. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
183. Id. at 371. Jo, writing of Hopper’s painting in Provincetown:
He cares only for the common denominator in houses, roads,
etc. & is not beguiled by so much individuality. He no longer
cares to work out from the thing, wants only to make
sketches here & there & compare his own subjects in the
studio which is much more comfortable, heaven knows. We
know all about working in a cold wind or with mosquitoes or
knats [sic] or nosee-ums plagueing [sic] the life out of one, &
the publicity of working out too is so distracting,
insufferable for E[dward].
Id.
184. See id. at 438.
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substitute the inventions of the intellect for a
pristine imaginative conception. The inner life of
a human being is a vast and varied realm and
does not concern itself alone with stimulating
arrangements of color, form, and design.185
Rather, Hopper maintained that abstraction, whether in
painting or in life, leads us away from the specificity of our
being and the need to engage with that environment. Hopper
wrote:
There is a school of painting called abstractionist
or non objective which is derived largely from the
work of Paul Cézanne, that attempts to create
“pure painting” that is, an art which will use
form, color and design for their own sakes, and
independent of man’s experience of life and his
association with nature. I do not believe such an
aim can be achieved by a human being. Whether
we wish it or not we are all bound to the earth
with our experience of life and the reactions of
the mind, heart, and eye, and our sensations, by
no means, consist entirely of form, color and
design. We would be leaving out a great deal that
I consider worth while [sic] expressing in
painting, and it can not [sic] be expressed in
literature.186
For these same reasons, the law of cities must find ways to
connect with the visual arts as other aspects of the law have
with literature. The experience of place is physical, and when
reduced to words, descriptions of places become subject to the
tropes, conventions, and expectations of written word. Notably,
we ask whether it is fiction or non-fiction, whether there is a
narrative thread, whether the story is compelling. In that way,
we turn away in literature from the place itself to evaluate the
art of the text. The law of cities deserves a relationship with an
185. Id. at 460.
186. Id. at 401.
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art that seeks to represent the physical in a manner in which
we primarily experience it: through the visual. To be a dialogue
of use to the law of cities, though, that art cannot simply represent the city as it is, for the law of cities is already
inundated with evidence of the city of how it is in maps,
technical drawings and the like. What Casey posits, and
Hopper seconds, is that it is the visual artist’s use of memory
and internalization of a location that permits the visual artist
to present a place more truly than the place could ever present
itself in life or on a map. It is that sense of place that the visual
arts provides to the law of cities—the ability to dialogue with
the place in a way that is not on a map or a title description—
that speaks to, and adds richness to, the place that is bound by
legal description.
Hopper saw this at work in small ways, and in big terms.
He was long considered an “American” painter187 and as
embodying the “American Scene,”188 but these descriptions also
187. Id. at 494. Hopper said for a Time cover story in 1956,
The thing that makes me so mad is the “American Scene”
business . . . I never tried to do the American scene as
Benton and Curry and the midwestern painters did. I think
the American Scene painters caricatured America. I always
wanted to do myself. The French painters didn’t talk about
the “French Scene,” or the English painters the “English
scene.”
Id.
188. Id. at 234. In the March, 1927 edition of The Arts, Lloyd Goodrich
referred to Hopper as an “eminently native painter,” and stated, “It is hard to
think of another painter who is getting more of the quality of America into
his canvases than Edward Hopper.” Id. at 203. Levin writes:
The call for an authentic American art had already sounded
in Emerson’s essay, “Self-Reliance,” which Hopper would
cite in his next major essay on an American artist: An why
need we copy the Doric or the Gothic model? Beauty,
convenience, grandeur of thought and quaint expression are
as near to us as to any, and if the American artist will study
with hope and love the precise thing to be done by him,
considering the climate, the soil, the length of the day, the
wants of the people, the habit and form of the government,
he will create a house in which all these will find
themselves fitted, and taste and sentiment will be satisfied
also.
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bothered him precisely because it was a nationalistic
abstraction, and belied the specificity of individual places that
he thought should have priority, and to which his work paid
homage. Hopper wrote, in preparation for a show:
I hope though that in the publicity to be given
this show there will be no reference to the
“American Scene.” . . .
If one looks out of one’s window in Ohio,
Massachusetts, or California, and reports
honestly what one sees and feels with one’s
personal vision of the world in command, that
will be one’s interpretation of the American
scene. It is part of our daily existence. Even the
mystics can not [sic] ignore it.189
Out of these two aspects of Hopper—the filtering of the
environment through his interior and personal experience and
his commitment to the particular scene—a dialogue between
the visual arts and the law of cities emerges. For one of the
perpetual dilemmas in the law of cities is for whom the law
exists. For some, the overarching concern is property rights,
and the desire to maintain those rights. But if such a legal
regime begins to approach a Hopper painting, it must contend
with a very personal reaction and interpretation of the city
found in a Hopper work. Independent of the question of
property rights—highly abstract concepts—the city is the space
of life where individual subjects, like Hopper, seek a personal
vision of the world in their environment. The law of cities, to
the extent it purports to defend anything of individual liberties,
has to take into account how to address this personal vision
and the interior life of those whose lives go on in the midst of
law’s abstractions.
To further evaluate these concepts, the remainder of this
tableau will focus on several ways in which Hopper specifically
engaged with the evolution of cities. Hopper lived on

Id. at 204-05.
189. Id. at 480.
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Washington Square Park in New York City190 at a time when it
was transitioning from a square dominated by residential
buildings reminiscent of the gilded era of Henry James
novels,191 to its modern incarnation, dominated by mid-rise
skyscrapers. At the center of the transition was New York
University, which Hopper fought on both its larger ambitions
as well as its efforts to remove Hopper from his home on the
square.192
Two aspects of this dispute are especially evident in
Hopper’s painting and relevant to the law of cities: the scale of
cities and the transformation of a neighborhood. Skyscrapers
are notably absent from most of Hopper’s paintings, especially
for a painter of New York City in the first half of the twentieth
century. When present, skyscrapers are often in the distance
and typically cutting a jagged hole in an otherwise fully formed
and human-scaled city scene. A classic example is The City, a
painting in which Hopper took a cinematic bird’s-eye view of
Washington Square Park, then an elegant array of
brownstones and mansard roof-topped buildings, but also
portrayed in the distance, a skyscraper looms, cut off by the top
of the frame.193 The painting represents Hopper’s ambivalent
attitude towards skyscrapers, as well as the changing face of
the twentieth century generally.194 Hopper considered
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 247.
See, e.g., HENRY JAMES, WASHINGTON SQUARE (1880).
HOPPER BIOGRAPHY, supra note 176, at 395.
Id. at 201.
He shared the climate of opinion that would find voice in
critics like Lewis Mumford, who soon published articles
with such titles as “Is the Skyscraper Tolerable?” and
“Botched Cities.” For them, the skyscraper represented
everything that was wrong with modern urban America,
from the superficiality of material values to the increased
standardization of life.

Id.
194. Id. at 229.
He rarely represented skyscrapers at all, and when he did,
he reduced them to fragmentary glimpses or intrusions on
the cityscape. . . . His recurrent visual ironies on the
manifestations of modern life suggest his highly ambivalent
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American Victorian architecture the country’s native style, and
his sentiments allied with Henry James, who argued that
skyscrapers “never begin to speak to you, in the manner of the
builded [sic] majesties of the world as we have heretofore
known such–towers or fortresses or palaces—with the
authority of things of permanence or even of things of long
duration.”195
From the contemporary perspective, given over to
skyscrapers, Hopper’s perspective can appear quaint, dated,
even conservative. But it is also evocative of something that
happens all the time in cities: changes of use and changes of
scale. Such changes, such as the arrival of skyscrapers on
Washington Square, can be viewed as a matter of property
rights, or as a matter of newly available building materials, or
as an evolution of taste and style. But Hopper’s position is
indicative of a perspective that is almost always undervalued
by the law of cities: the perspective of the person whose life is
changing, whose neighborhood is disappearing. Hopper’s
tension with skyscrapers in his paintings gives the law of cities
a chance to imagine the perspective of a person whose
neighborhood is lost and will soon be gone. Such perspectives
are also evident in Hopper’s 1932 painting City Roofs, in which
Hopper painted a view from the rooftop of his studio.
“[P]artially visible on the back right side of the canvas is a pale
yellow skyscraper recently built at One Fifth Avenue.”196 Its
imposing scale tells a similar story of the evolution of cities,
and the sense of loss Hopper felt for the older, smaller scale of
the neighborhood.
The resulting effects of the law of cities are, in fact, a city.
Paintings of specific locations, as Casey notes, are
representations not just of a scene of the city, but are intended
to evoke the broader experience of the city or region: what

attitude toward the changes occurring in the twentiethcentury society; it is his profound alienation from
contemporary life that makes his art so characteristic of
modernity itself.
Id.
195. Id. at 279-80.
196. HOPPER BIOGRAPHY, supra note 176, at 247.
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Hopper painted of Washington Square was true of all
Manhattan, not to mention most urban American cities of the
time. A dialogue with such paintings does not directly affect
any right to develop, but it does bring to question the effects of
development on individuals who live in cities. As Lefebvre
noted, it is the lived space that ultimately matters most to the
individual, because it is the location of experience.197 Planning
for dwelling units, for housing units, reducing vehicle miles
traveled, or whatever the planning regime may proffer—not to
mention the abstractions of individual property rights—all may
fail to acknowledge that cities are not just machines for living,
but for the living of individual lives.
A dialogue with the visual arts is a step toward softening
the hard film of abstraction that accretes when the law of cities
plans the future. The question emerges: should the law of cities
incorporate experience with visual arts into law itself? Even if
law remains textual in its form, as it is likely to do in
substantial part, the law of cities benefits from engaging with
lived experience, as does any aspect of law. When the law of
cities engages with how cities are lived, we come closer to
building legal regimes that build places that feel like home. If
literature is generally law’s other, as Peter Brooks posits,198 we
may go one step further here: the visual arts are equally the
other of the law of cities, each entwined and enmeshed in the
other’s vision of itself. For though a walk outside can give one
impression of the city, the visual arts that focus on cities, can
provide an image that contains more, as Casey would say, than
a walk along all of the city streets could ever do. And while the
essence of a city—even an essence of diversity, especially an
essence of diversity—will never find its way into law directly
from a painting, the law of cities should strive to maintain
what its inhabitants seek for it to be. Paintings, such as those
of Hopper, offer a window into what a place is that the law of
cities necessitates.

197. See supra text accompanying note 138.
198. See supra text accompanying note 166.

49

MILLER

2/28/2013 10:36 PM

Final

232

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1

VII.Conclusion
At first blush, it is arguable for some that the role of the
visual in the law of cities is narrow, perhaps even esoteric, with
regard to other concerns. Against such claims, one need only
recall the vast distances covered here: the cultural and legal
value of maps, the legal role of aesthetics in building cities, the
production of space through the abstractions of zoning and
planning, and the role of the visual arts in informing the law of
cities. Drawn in such relief, the questions of the visual in the
law of cities emerge from the incidental, and law’s general
inattention to the visual begins to seem inexcusable.
A blind statue of justice makes clear the law’s general
preference that the visual be excommunicated from the law’s
work. Above all else, the tableaux of this article illustrate that
the visual and the law of cities are inextricably linked. To the
extent the general legal bias against the visual is applied in the
law of cities, such bias obscures the law of cities’ ability to see
clearly its own functions and the role of the visual in them.
Such blindness is not without danger. As the first two
tableaux on diseños and aesthetics revealed, cultural biases are
often embedded in the visual. As the last two tableaux on the
production and representation of space revealed, the relative
abstraction of legal regimes can belittle, even hide, the
experience and needs of the individual. Acknowledging, and
openly confronting, the role of the visual in the law of cities
makes it more likely that the law will adequately address the
potential problems associated with the visual that may arise in
the quotidian functioning of legal practice, while also
permitting the visual to provide more powerful tools, and a
richer exchange of ideas, about the values and choice
undergirding how the law of cities guides the development of
where we live.
Teaching the law of cities to see the visual does not rewrite any law outright, but does make the law of cities more
honest in its machinations, and brings into the discussion an
approach to the visual of cities beyond aesthetics, one that
embraces the visual as the “other” of the law of cities. This asks
of more than beauty to inquire in detailed ways how a city
becomes a home for its inhabitants, and how inhabitants
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respond and reflect upon changes in the city, such as the city’s
inevitable changes in scale and use. These are several ways the
visual is uniquely qualified to assist the law of cities achieve its
ends. With continued dialogue on this subject, more uses of the
visual in the law of cities are certain to emerge and further the
creation of cities that evince what Wallace Stegner once called
a “sense of place.”199

199. See generally WALLACE STEGNER, THE SENSE OF PLACE (1986).
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